An estate for a person's own life.

Definition source

Kinnear, J. B., Digest of House of Lords Cases Decided on Appeal from Scotland, 1709-1864 — Glossary of Scottish Law Terms (Edinburgh, 1865). Public domain.

Legal Subject: Liferent

Case	Date	Legal Subject	Abstract
Alexander Cunnynghame v. William Muir of Caldwall	1760	Possession, Disposition, Retour, Charter, Liferent, Feu duties	Alexander Cunnynghame pursued a claim to the Five Pound Land of Craigbeat and Kersemeadow against William Muir of Caldwall, who objected on the basis of tax-roll and vassal land distinctions and argued that Cunnynghame’s title was nominal and fictitious and that he lacked possession. Muir replied to Cunnynghame’s answers, insisting that the pursuer held neither valid title nor actual possession of the lands. Cunnynghame defended his liferent-right to the properties, rebutting the objections by citing historical retours and demonstrating vassal possession.
Allardice, et all v. Allardice	1795	Succession, Liferent, Disposition, Infeftment, Heritor, Entail
Andrew Zuill v. Thomas Bryce Buchanan	1830	Sequestration, Interlocutor, Liferent, Rent, Reduction, Infeftment	Andrew Zuill or Yool, farmer at Bridgend of Boquhan, raised an action of reduction against Thomas Bryce Buchanan to set aside sheriff's decrees and interlocutors obtained for unpaid farm rents and damages, alleging the proceedings were invalid and unlawful. Buchanan reclaimed against Lord Mackenzie's interlocutor and lodged defences asserting his heritable proprietorship and the validity of a liferent grant to William Gray. Zuill subsequently reclaimed, arguing that Buchanan possessed title to demand the rents during his possession of the subjects.
Bromfield v. Paterson et al	1786	Succession, Debt, Liferent, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment	Stephen Bromfield pursued Mary Paterson, Alexander Campbell, and Henry Campbell regarding the estate of Eccles, contending that the defenders were bound by an entail and could not claim the lands without limitations. The defenders argued that the entail of 1743 and its 1755 amendment bound the succession to the barony of Eccles and lands of Stow, and further maintained that a deed of 1758 continued the prior entail, citing the precedent in Lowrie v. Spalding.
Cameron v. Cameron	1792	Lease, Succession, Tack, Aliment, Liferent, Adjudication	Ro. Craigie petitioned the Court to alter the Lord Ordinary's interlocutors sustaining claims to the lands of Laick and Branahawn. The respondent argued that the lease of those lands secured by her father ought to be upheld notwithstanding contested settlements and allegations of hardship.
Coventry v. Lord Hailes' Interlocutor	1787	Succession, Legacy, Liferent, Aliment, Testament, Debt	Robert Coventry presented a petition challenging an interlocutor pronounced by Lord Hailes. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Dickie v. Lord Henderland's Interlocutor	1789	Reduction, Succession, Improbation, Feu duties, Disposition, Liferent	Patrick Dickie, eldest lawful son of William Dickie and pursuer, petitioned the Court to alter its recent interlocutor against Lord Henderland. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Drummonds v. Seton, et al	1794	Bankruptcy, Debt, Liferent, Creditor, Trustees, Sequestration	Robert and Henry Drummonds, creditors of Hugh Seton, disputed with Archibald Seton, Hugh’s heir-male, over whether the liferent of a dividend from Hugh’s insolvent estate belonged to the creditors at large or to Archibald as heir. The Drummonds argued that Archibald could not rank for dividend until the full £8000 marriage provision was paid, or that he could be ranked for no more than the value of his father’s liferent-right as a debt in diem, while Archibald petitioned to reclaim the dividend, contending that trustees had to be satisfied from the marriage contract debt before creditors could claim the liferent. Robert Blair separately petitioned the Court to alter its interlocutor, and the parties further disputed whether Hugh’s liferent right was vested and unconditional or conditional upon payment of the marriage provision.
Fotheringham and Hume v. Ogilvie and Others	1795	Succession, Debt, Aliment, Liferent, Disposition, Creditor	William Fotheringham and Hume pursued claims to the Balfour estate against Ogilvie and others, petitioning the Court in 1795 and again in 1797 to alter interlocutors respecting the succession. The respondents defended these interlocutors, maintaining that under a marriage contract the estate had vested in fee-simple in the second son, who predeceased his parents, thereby excluding the pursuers' claims as heirs. The litigation turned on whether the second son's fee-simple right to the Balfour estate took precedence over the pursuers' asserted rights in the Powrie succession.
Francis Fraser v. David Middleton	1793	Tack, Infeftment, Disposition, Succession, Liferent, Lease	David Middleton, defender, argued that a lease obtained under a valid personal grant from an apparent heir must be preferable to an infeftment void by reason of non habente potestatem. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Francis Pinkerton Drummond v. William Abernethy Drummond, &c	1792	Succession, Liferent, Prescription, Disposition, Infeftment, Heritor	Francis Pinkerton Drummond, as pursuer, sought against William Abernethy Drummond and others the correction of a charter or infeftment to reflect the true succession under a 1722 marriage contract rather than heirs-male in general. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Gordon v. Representatives of Michie	1794	Tack, Possession, Rent, Liferent, Heritor, Sequestration	Gordon pursued the Representatives of Michie regarding possession of the Craig of Clunie lands. The petitioners, as heirs of a liferent-tacksman, maintained that they were entitled to continue in possession without summary removal, arguing that the law presumed tacit agreement and required warning before ejection. They initially submitted a memorial advancing this principle, and subsequently petitioned for an order permitting them to remain in possession and restraining the respondents from entering and inclosing the grounds.
Haldane v. Duncan	1802	Deed, Liferent, Property rights	After the death of Mr. George Haldane, his widow, Margaret Haldane, claimed that she had the life-rent right over the lands of Gleneagles, Haldane, and Aberuthven. Margaret said that her husband had left her such property rights which he had inherited from his uncle, Robert Haldane. The defendant, Viscount Duncan, objected the petition arguing that the transfer to Margaret was irregular and contrary to the conditions to settle the succession to real property.
Helen Fergus or M'Leish, and Husband v. Isobel Fergus or Izat, and Husband	1830	Debt, Succession, Aliment, Trust, Disposition, Liferent	Helen Fergus or M'Leish and her husband John M'Leish pursued Isobel Fergus or Izat and her husband John Izat for exhibition of debts and payment from the estate of James Fergus. The defenders counterclaimed that prior payments they had made for M'Leish's debts exceeded the £300 legacy and half of the moveable estate due to them, leaving a balance of £60 1 3 owed by the pursuers. The pursuers maintained the validity of an 1814 settlement and denied allegations of preferential treatment, while the defenders subsequently reclaimed against an interlocutor of the court.
Ilay Ferrier v. William Morehead	1789	Disposition, Infeftment, Freeholder, Liferent, Feu duties, Valuation	Ilay Ferrier, Esquire, Colonel of the late Scotch Brigade, petitioned the Court to overturn the freeholders' rejection of his claim to be enrolled as a freeholder of Stirlingshire, which William Morehead of Herbertshire opposed by alleging that Ferrier's liferent infeftment was nominal, fictitious, and subservient to Sir Archibald Edmonstone's political design. The parties exchanged replies, answers, and condescendences regarding the validity of the land descriptions, valuations, and the genuineness of the qualification, with Ferrier responding to claims of illusory price and interference in vassal arrangements. Ferrier subsequently petitioned the Court to alter its interlocutor, and Morehead answered maintaining that the superiorities were illusory and the enrollment improper.
John Melville v. TheCreditors of George Smiton	1794	Infeftment, Liferent, Succession, Ranking of Creditors, Security, Conveyance	John Melville petitioned the Court to alter an interlocutor that had held void the infeftment in favor of George Gordon's heirs, opposing the creditors of George Smiton. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
John Miller, &c. v. Mrs A. Moodie or Anderson	1829	Creditor, Disposition, Succession, Liferent, Adjudication, Interlocutor	John Miller, William Roy, and William Thomson raised an action against Mrs Amelia Moodie or Anderson to compel her to complete a valid title and grant discharge of a heritable bond previously assigned to her. The defender denied that she was bound to make up titles to her children's heirs for the discharge of the bond, and subsequently submitted a reclaiming note seeking recall of the interlocutor and her assoilziement. The litigation concluded when William Harley, tutor-at-law for John Anderson, minuted that the pupil had no interest in the bond and consented to the completion of title at the defender's expense.
John Minto and John Gavin v. John Kirkpatrick	1831	Succession, Debt, Creditor, Aliment, Liferent, Tack	John Minto and John Gavin pursued John Kirkpatrick for a decree compelling exhibition of title-deeds and accounts relating to Margaret Sime's inheritance and annuity rights. They reclaimed against an interlocutor pronounced by Lord Medwyn.
Lunn v. Creditors of Lunn	1802	Bankruptcy, Debt, Liferent	In May 1799, Walter Lunn, the Pursuer, was rendered bankrupt and subsequently sued for cessio bonorum. The Pursuer claimed that his insolvency was the result of innocent misfortune, while the Defender, his creditors, claimed that the Pursuer had engaged in fraud, thus disqualifying him from cessio bonorum. John Nixon, as Defender court-appointed trustee of Lunn's sequestered estate, opposed Lunn's claim to cessio bonorum after Nixon's review of Lunn's finances returned a much larger debt than Lunn had originally claimed. Nixon challenged the profits that Lunn claimed from a subject in Edinburgh liferented by his wife. Nixon argued that these rents were far less conseqential than Lunn claimed and that a competing claim on these rents by the family of Mrs. Lunn currently before the court would cause long delays in Walter Lunn's creditors receiving any of this money. Nixon also claimed that Lunn overstated the travel expenses he incurred while working as a traveling packman through the country of Roxburgshire.
MacDonald v. MacGillivray	1793	Succession, Liferent, Trustee, Creditor, Interest, Debt	Alexander Macdonald, trustee for the creditors of bankrupt Lieutenant Alexander Fraser, sued Farquhar Macgillivray to recover £400 due under a bond. Thomas, Alexander, and Ann Fraser, children of Lieutenant Fraser, argued that the fee of the lands of Aberchalader was vested in their mother rather than their father and thus not subject to the creditors' claim. Macgillivray maintained that the fee of the £400 was vested in Lieutenant Fraser rather than his wife or children.
Park v. Glen	1778	Deathbed, Bonds, Liferent	Elizabeth Park owned some bonds from the sale of her late brother's lands. She later conveyed these bonds to her cousin, Robert Park. Robert Park had a sister, Margaret, but disliked Margaret's husband. Shortly before his death, Robert Park conveyed the aforementioned bonds to his cousin, William Glen. Because Robert Park died less than a month after this disposition, Margaret Park challenged it upon the head of deathbed. Glen argued before Lord Braxfield that the subjects in question constituted a personal right and could not be challenged on the head of deathbed. The pursuer, Margaret Park, argued that as their price was made a burden upon land, they could not be alienated upon deathbed. Lord Braxfield found that one of the bonds in question, granted by Adam Walker for the lands of Wooden, constituted a heritable right. He refused further representation from Glen, who then petitioned the Court for review.
Ritchie v. Patersons	1794	Succession, Aliment, Interlocutor, Liferent, Debt, Jus RelictÃ¦	Agnes Ritchie pursued the Patersons for one-fifth of her grandfather John Paterson’s moveable estate under his settlement, seeking to claim the share notwithstanding her mother’s predecease. The defenders maintained that she was entitled only to one-fifth of the dead’s part of the estate rather than one-fifth of the whole personal estate.
Robert Henry v. William Watt and Others	1831	Succession, Disposition, Entail, Liferent, Teinds, Jus Crediti	Robert Henry pursued a claim to the Woodend estate against William Watt and others, who defended by asserting that the entail’s conditions protected the heirs of Robert Watt rather than the Crown and that Henry could not enforce the restrictions against them. The defenders subsequently lodged a reclaiming note requesting that the Court alter an interlocutor pronounced by Lord Corehouse.
Robert Wellwood v. Robert Wellwood and Others	1791	Liferent, Tailzie, Entail, Infeftment, Succession, Tack	Robert Wellwood of Garvock pursued Robert Wellwood and others, contending that he was not an heir of tailzie and therefore not bound by the entail’s fetters. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Shanks v. Kirk-Session of Creditors	1796	Succession, Liferent, Disposition, Infeftment, Terce, Seisin	Margaret Shanks pursued the Kirk-Session of Creditors to establish her right to terce in lands which she claimed her late husband Thomas Howie had held in fee by precept of sasine and infeftment at his death. The defenders maintained that the fee had been vested in Thomas's father John Howie rather than in Thomas himself, and accordingly sought to be assoilzied from Shanks's claim.
Sir Alexander Campbell, Baronet v. David Ballingall	1791	Feu duties, Possession, Freeholder, Liferent, Election contest, Entail	Sir Alexander Campbell, Baronet and others pursued David Ballingall, alleging that altered circumstances had affected his possession or right since enrollment and that his qualification was nominal or fictitious. Ballingall answered the condescendence and petition, denying any alteration of circumstances and maintaining that his qualification was genuine and valid. The dispute turned on whether Ballingall's enrollment remained effective given the alleged changes and the nature of his qualification.
The Marchioness of Titchfield and her Husband, for his interest v. Alexander Penrose Cuming	1797	Succession, Debt, Liferent, Entail, Heritor, Disposition	The Marchioness of Titchfield and her husband, for his interest, pursued Alexander Penrose Cuming, who defended on the plea of res judicata. The pursuers petitioned the Court to alter the interlocutor sustaining this defence, and Cuming answered. They then presented a second petition asking the Court to overturn the interlocutor regarding the res judicata plea, to which Cuming also answered.
William Stewart v. Mrs. Garland or Pirie and James Pirie	1831	Succession, Liferent, Assignation, Debt, Tack, Deed	William Stewart, Sheriff-Clerk of Kincardineshire, pursued Mrs. Garland or Pirie and James Pirie for multiple poinding and exoneration of debts owed to the deceased John Pirie, tenant in Cairnbeg. Stewart condescended on the fund in medio against the relict and representatives of the late tenant, and James Pirie subsequently lodged a reclaiming note against Lord Corehouse's interlocutor.