A binding sale of heritage may be concluded by an interchange of missives, as well as by a formal minute of sale. In the missives, the one party offers to buy or sell on certain conditions: the other party accepts of the offer. This constitutes a complete contract, which may be afterwards carried into effect by the execution of a disposition. See Disposition. The minute is a regular deed with a clause of registration for diligence, and a testing clause, executed according to all the requisites of the act 1681, c. 5. The missives may be holograph of the parties, the acceptor prefixing a copy of the offer in his own handwriting.
Definition source
Bell, William, A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, 7th ed. rev. George Ross (Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute, 1861), s.v. “Deed.” Public domain.
Legal Subject: Deed |
| Case | Date | Legal Subject | Abstract |
|---|---|---|---|
| Archibald Douglas of Douglas v. Douglas, Duke of Hamilton | 1778 | Deed | This case constitutes an appeal to the House of Lords and Court of Session regarding an infamous earlier case, dubbed "The Douglas Cause." That case, which was settled by the House of Lords in 1769, revolved around the contested inheritance of the vast wealth of the Duke of Douglas, who died in 1761. The heir-male to the Duke of Douglas, the Duke of Hamilton, contested the property claims of Archibald Douglas, the son of the Duke of Douglas' sister, from many angles. In this last-ditch appeal, brought before the Court of Session and House of Lords, the Duke of Hamilton asserted that a 1744 deed of revocation put forth by the late Duke of Douglas was in fact a settlement of succession that disinherited his sister, Lady Jane Douglas, from all properties that had been passed to the family through investiture. On December 19, 1778 the Court of Session found that the Duke of Hamilton had no claim under the deed of October 16th, 1744, declaring it a deed of revocation and not of settlement. On March 27, 1779 the House of Lords dismissed an appeal of the Duke of Hamilton. The memorials submitted to the Court of Session in October of 1778 contain a history of the Angus and Douglas families and their investitures, and an overview of similar cases to "The Douglas Cause." |
| Cunynnghame v. Whitefood, et al | 1797 | Succession, Deed, Aliment, Disposition, Reduction, Minor | Lieutenant Colonel Francis Cunynghame pursued James Whitefoord and others, seeking to set aside a settlement executed by Whitefoord in 1792 while he was a minor. Cunynghame argued that the deed was void because a minor could not alter the succession to heritable estate established by the former proprietor, and further contended that the settlement lacked proper delivery. The litigation raised the question of whether a minor's deed could effectively convey or settle heritable property. |
| Frank and his Tutor v. Frank, et al. | 1793 | Witness, Succession, Reduction, Aliment, Deed, Forgery | Frank and his Tutor sought to reduce a disposition granted by the deceased Charles Frank in February 1791 in favor of the defenders. The defenders argued that the instrumentary witnesses to the deed were incompetent to depose whether they saw the party subscribe, while the pursuers challenged the competency of Janet Smith, a witness for the defenders, on the ground that her annuity depended upon the validity of the deed, and petitioned the Court to alter its interlocutor refusing to admit her. The pursuers subsequently presented a formal petition for reduction and annulment of the disposition. |
| Fullarton & Fullarton v. Dalrymple | 1796 | Succession, Deed, Possession, Prescription, Debt, Tack | |
| Haldane v. Duncan | 1802 | Deed, Liferent, Property rights | After the death of Mr. George Haldane, his widow, Margaret Haldane, claimed that she had the life-rent right over the lands of Gleneagles, Haldane, and Aberuthven. Margaret said that her husband had left her such property rights which he had inherited from his uncle, Robert Haldane. The defendant, Viscount Duncan, objected the petition arguing that the transfer to Margaret was irregular and contrary to the conditions to settle the succession to real property. |
| Hamilton v. MacTaggart | 1793 | Debt, Bankruptcy, Creditor, Bill of Exchange, Sequestration, Deed | William M'Taggart answered the petition of Messrs. Hamilton and Co. and James Provan and Co., who claimed that a sale of goods was void under the 1696 Act. Based on the single document cataloged for this case. |
| Henderson v. Wilson and Melvilles | 1795 | Succession, Deed, Will, Entail, Aliment, Tailzie | Robert Henderson pursued a claim against George Wilson regarding the succession to Walter Bowman’s estate, while Catharine and Christian Melvilles argued that a 1763 entail was ineffectual and had revoked an earlier 1757 deed, thereby opening the succession to heirs ab intestato. Henderson petitioned the Court to alter a recent interlocutor, and Wilson answered both Henderson’s petition and the Melvilles’ memorial, contesting their respective positions on the disputed entailments. |
| Hill v. Swinton | 1796 | Contract, Security, Deed, Breach of Contract, Debt, Copyright | Peter Hill, bookseller in Edinburgh, sought to relinquish his interest in the copyright of a book he had contracted to publish with John Swinton, Advocate. Swinton maintained that Hill remained bound by the agreement to accept delivery of sixty copies annually until all four hundred and eighty-six remaining copies were delivered. The pleadings set forth the parties' competing positions on the enforceability of the publication contract and the disposition of the unsold stock. |
| M'Calmond v. Park | 1792 | Tack, Lease, Deed, Rent, Interlocutor, Possession | James M'Calmond petitioned the Court to alter Lord Stonefield's interlocutor refusing his bill of advocation against Hugh-Gavin Park, Tacksman of the Lands of Camregan. Park answered, contending that an unstamped obligation was not valid in law or equity. |
| McNish v. Scougal and Ogilvy | 1787 | Witness, Deed, Reduction, Cautioner, Improbation, Act of Parliament | John M'Nish pursued the reduction of a bond of caution he had granted to Messrs Scougal and Ogilvy, merchants in Leith, contending that the deed was void for lack of witnesses to his subscription and because he had not acknowledged his signature at the time of execution. Scougal and Ogilvy argued that the bond remained valid despite M'Nish's denial and the absence of attesting witnesses. The parties filed opposing informations regarding the formal validity of the instrument. |
| Montgomery v. Fowlis | 1794 | Succession, Deed, Debt, Prescription, Disposition, Creditor | Montgomery, as pursuer, asserted that his adjudging creditor titles to the lands of Warrix and others were valid and complete while those of the defenders Fowlis were void. The defenders countered that a deed of tailzie executed in 1729, though not formally delivered, had been homologated by Janet Simpson's acceptance of a debt from the estate and thus constituted a valid title. Robert Barclay subsequently petitioned the Court for permission to present further argument against the defenders' claims based on an adjudication of heir rights under a disposition dated 1722. |
| Ogilvie v. Mercer | 1793 | Succession, Deed, Reduction, Disposition, Entail, Tailzie | Sir John Ogilvy of Invercarity, Hope Stewart of Ballechin, and Miss Margaret Mercer Elphinstone challenged the validity of a deed of entail executed by Robert Mercer on 22 February 1791, arguing that it was void as a death‑bed settlement. Katharine Mercer subsequently petitioned the Court to alter the interlocutor pronounced in the case. |
| Ross, et al. v. Aglianby | 1796 | Debt, Terce, Jus Relictæ, Deed, Succession, Interlocutor | Ross and others pursued Aglianby in a dispute over estate distribution involving competing claims to terce and conventional provisions. Mrs Lowthian challenged an interlocutor voiding her conventional provisions and sought to retain funds and claim terce from her late husband's estate, prompting the respondents to answer regarding the exclusion of terce and the effect of obligations to George Mackenzie's trustees. Mrs Sarah Aglianby subsequently petitioned the court to alter its recent interlocutor respecting her own claim to terce from her husband's Scottish lands. |
| Rutherford v. Caverhill, et al | 1787 | Succession, Debt, Aliment, Deed, Mala Fides, Creditor | Mrs Helen Rutherford sought to reduce deeds of settlement executed by the deceased Archibald Jerdon in favour of Jerdon Caverhill, contending that the instruments were invalid owing to his dotage and undue influence. Archibald Jerdon of Bonjedward and his Tutors, with others, defended the deeds and argued that the Court should not reduce them. |
| Susanna Vere v. The Earl of Hyndford, and Others | 1791 | Deed, Reduction, Aliment, Succession, Arbitration, Adjudication | Susanna Vere pursued the Earl of Hyndford, John Hamilton of Westburn, William Porteous of Carmacoup, John Bannatyne of Castlebank, and Robert Bell regarding the authority to control the proceedings of tutors, and the defenders argued that Vere possessed no power to impose a negative upon such proceedings. Based on the single document cataloged for this case. |
| Thomson v. Christie | 1784 | Competition, Deed | This case was about the effect of two deeds granted by the late James Christie. In the first deed, James granted all of his property to his daughter Jean, his son-in-law Robert Thomson, and their children. Immediately after the deed was granted, Robert Thomson obtained infeftment on the property. In the second deed, James granted a parcel of the property to his daughter Janet, her husband John Morice, and their children. When James died, Janet took possession of the parcel, and the Thomsons took possession of James’s remaining property. However, twelve years later, the Thomson children sued Janet and her children to enforce the first deed. They sought past-due rent, compensation for James’s household furniture, and Janet’s removal from the parcel. Janet argued that the first deed was not meant to take effect until James’s death, and that it reserved to James the power to grant the second deed. |
| William Stewart v. Mrs. Garland or Pirie and James Pirie | 1831 | Succession, Liferent, Assignation, Debt, Tack, Deed | William Stewart, Sheriff-Clerk of Kincardineshire, pursued Mrs. Garland or Pirie and James Pirie for multiple poinding and exoneration of debts owed to the deceased John Pirie, tenant in Cairnbeg. Stewart condescended on the fund in medio against the relict and representatives of the late tenant, and James Pirie subsequently lodged a reclaiming note against Lord Corehouse's interlocutor. |
| Yorkston, et al. v. Grieve | 1794 | Deed, Witness, Testament, Succession, Assignation, Executor | Yorkston and his co-petitioners pursued Grieve concerning the validity of a testamentary deed executed by the illiterate Jean Ferguson. They argued that the instrument was valid despite the notary’s docquet failing to record that it was read over to the testatrix, whereas Grieve maintained that because Ferguson could neither read nor write, the deed required to be read to her before she authorized the notary’s signature, and was void for want of that formality. |
| Young v. Thompson | 1794 | Arrestment, Insanity, Deed, Succession, Debt, Aliment |
