Under a strict Scottish entail, made prior to 1848, the tenant in possession had never more than a life estate only, and consequently could not bar the entail. He may now do so with the consent of one or more of those in remainder. If born after 1848, or after the execution of any entail made subsequently, he may bar it without any consent. To make an entail effectual, it must have contained clauses prohibitory against the possessor selling, encumbering, or anew limiting the estate, irritant (avoiding) of any such acts, if he should do them, and resolutive (forfeiting) of his right to the estate in that case. These three sets of clauses constituted the fetters of a strict entail. Defect in any one avoided the entail as regards the particular procedure, whether selling, encumbering, or devising; but now it avoids the entail in all respects.

Definition source

Kinnear, J. B., Digest of House of Lords Cases Decided on Appeal from Scotland, 1709-1864 — Glossary of Scottish Law Terms (Edinburgh, 1865). Public domain.

Legal Subject: Entail

Case	Date	Legal Subject	Abstract
Alexander-Charles Maitland, & Others v. Dame Helen Maitland Gibson, & Spouse	1830	Compensation, Security, Succession, Debt, Tailzie, Entail	Alexander-Charles Maitland and other heirs of entail pursued Dame Helen Maitland Gibson and her spouse regarding £7000 paid by a canal company for consent to route a canal through the entailed estate. The pursuers sought to have the sum paid into a bank for lawful investment under the 1827 Act, asserting it was compensation for permanent damage belonging to the entail, while the defenders answered that it represented merely the value of the land and payment for temporary inconvenience. The court found that the defenders must compensate the heirs for the permanent damage sustained by the estate from the canal deviation, with the compensation to be paid from the £7000 received for the consent.
Allardice, et all v. Allardice	1795	Succession, Liferent, Disposition, Infeftment, Heritor, Entail
Bromfield v. Paterson et al	1786	Succession, Debt, Liferent, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment	Stephen Bromfield pursued Mary Paterson, Alexander Campbell, and Henry Campbell regarding the estate of Eccles, contending that the defenders were bound by an entail and could not claim the lands without limitations. The defenders argued that the entail of 1743 and its 1755 amendment bound the succession to the barony of Eccles and lands of Stow, and further maintained that a deed of 1758 continued the prior entail, citing the precedent in Lowrie v. Spalding.
Campbell v. Monboddo's Interlocuter	1793	Succession, Debt, Aliment, Reversion, Entail, Trustees	James Campbell petitioned against Lord Monboddo's interlocutor, asking the Court to alter the ruling that the reversion of the estate's sale price must be laid out upon lands. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Dunbar v. Dunbars, et al	1798	Succession, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment, Debt, Teinds	Sir Benjamin Dunbar, pursuer, presented a reclaiming petition asking the Court to alter its interlocutor of 2 February 1799, which had assoilzied him from the conclusions of his action against the defenders, the Dunbars, et al. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Edmonstone, Fraser, and Ferrier v. Trustees of General Simon Fraser	1791	Debt, Succession, Trustee, Entail, Disposition, Trust	Edmonstone, Fraser, and Ferrier pursued the Trustees of General Simon Fraser for payment of a Crown-gifted debt, insisting that the trustees were bound to pay the specified heirs rather than apply the funds to the entailed estate. The trustees maintained that the Crown’s gift of the debt to Archibald Fraser could not be enforced against the entailed estate of Lovat. They subsequently petitioned the Court to alter its recent interlocutor in the cause.
Gibson v. Reid	1795	Debt, Succession, Aliment, Entail, Terce, Tailzie	The respondent Gibson answered the petition of Christian Kerr Reid, contending that the petitioner’s condescendence underestimated the free rents of Hofelaw and failed to account for equitable relief for the widow. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Henderson v. Wilson and Melvilles	1795	Succession, Deed, Will, Entail, Aliment, Tailzie	Robert Henderson pursued a claim against George Wilson regarding the succession to Walter Bowman’s estate, while Catharine and Christian Melvilles argued that a 1763 entail was ineffectual and had revoked an earlier 1757 deed, thereby opening the succession to heirs ab intestato. Henderson petitioned the Court to alter a recent interlocutor, and Wilson answered both Henderson’s petition and the Melvilles’ memorial, contesting their respective positions on the disputed entailments.
Henry v. Russell	1794	Succession, Entail, Disposition, Sasine, Tailzie, Teinds
J. J. Hope Vere v. Right Hon. Charles Hope and Others	1822	Succession, Entail, Tailzie, Prescription, Disposition, Sasine	James Joseph Hope Vere pursued an action of declarator against the Right Honourable Charles Hope and the other Heirs of Entail of Craigiehall regarding the succession to the estate and the effect of the tailzie of 1708. The pursuer contended that the lands were held free of entail fetters, while the defenders maintained that the 1733 marriage contract had not altered the destination of the original entail and asserted that Hope Vere was barred from reduction by contravention, forfeiture, prescription, and the tailzie's resolutive clause. Between 1823 and 1830 the parties exchanged successive defences, informations, and revised cases disputing the construction of the entail and the validity of the subsequent titles.
John Earl of Rothes v. John Philp	1758	Debt, Succession, Entail, Infeftment, Tailzie, Creditor	John Philp pursued John Earl of Rothes for 5000 merks and interest due under a bond dated 1716. The Earl defended on the ground that the estate was entailed by a 1684 deed and 1687 charter, rendering it immune from ancestral debts. The litigation turned on whether the 1685 Tailzie Act required judicial registration of pre-1685 entails to render them valid against creditors, with the Earl asserting that the entail was binding under common law and a 1662 Court of Session decision and that the Act did not apply retroactively.
Mackay and Fullerton v. Dalrymples et al	1795	Succession, Possession, Reduction, Entail, Prescription, Sequestration	Mrs Marianne Mackay, subsequently the Honourable Mrs Hamilton Fullarton, and her husband Colonel William Fullarton pursued Sir Hew Hamilton Dalrymple and other representatives of the Dalrymple family regarding succession to the estate of Bargeny, asserting rights as nearest substitutes under a 1688 marriage contract and entail which provided for female-line succession, while the defenders claimed title under a 1742 charter and seisin. The litigation involved petitions for sequestration of the estate, disputes over the custody of title-deeds and the removal of seals from estate repositories, and exchanges regarding the pursuers' standing to displace the defenders as heirs-apparent, the validity of a plea of minority, and allegations of contravention of irritant clauses. The pursuers sought to compel production of writings relied upon by the defenders and to conjoin reduction and declarator processes to ascertain their position under the entail, while the defenders maintained their lawful possession and disputed the pursuers' entitlement to the succession.
Mrs A. V. S. T. Anderson v. John Anderson	1827	Reduction, Tailzie, Entail, Succession, Aliment, Expenses	Mrs A. V. S. T. Anderson, pursuer, lodged a reclaiming note against an interlocutor pronounced by Lord Moncreiff in her action against John Anderson, defender. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Mrs. Euphemia Innes v. Duke of Gordon	1831	Succession, Lease, Rent, Debt, Entail, Res judicata	Mrs. Euphemia Innes, relict and executrix of John Innes, presented a reclaiming note against George, Duke of Gordon, asking the Court to alter the interlocutor sustaining the Duke's defences. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Ogilvie v. Mercer	1793	Succession, Deed, Reduction, Disposition, Entail, Tailzie	Sir John Ogilvy of Invercarity, Hope Stewart of Ballechin, and Miss Margaret Mercer Elphinstone challenged the validity of a deed of entail executed by Robert Mercer on 22 February 1791, arguing that it was void as a death‑bed settlement. Katharine Mercer subsequently petitioned the Court to alter the interlocutor pronounced in the case.
Preston v. Wellwood	1791	Trust, Entail, Debt, Aliment, Succession, Lease	Sir Charles Preston and the other trustees appointed by the deceased Robert Wellwood of Garvock sought suspension and interdict against Robert Wellwood, now of Garvock, to prevent him from cutting timber on the entailed estate. Wellwood answered, claiming he was entitled to cut timber on the estate notwithstanding the deeds of entail and trust executed by his father. The trustees maintained that they possessed the exclusive right to prevent the cutting of growing timber in order to preserve the value of the trust estate.
Robert Henry v. William Watt and Others	1831	Succession, Disposition, Entail, Liferent, Teinds, Jus Crediti	Robert Henry pursued a claim to the Woodend estate against William Watt and others, who defended by asserting that the entail’s conditions protected the heirs of Robert Watt rather than the Crown and that Henry could not enforce the restrictions against them. The defenders subsequently lodged a reclaiming note requesting that the Court alter an interlocutor pronounced by Lord Corehouse.
Robert Wellwood v. Robert Wellwood and Others	1791	Liferent, Tailzie, Entail, Infeftment, Succession, Tack	Robert Wellwood of Garvock pursued Robert Wellwood and others, contending that he was not an heir of tailzie and therefore not bound by the entail’s fetters. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Sir Alexander Campbell, Baronet v. David Ballingall	1791	Feu duties, Possession, Freeholder, Liferent, Election contest, Entail	Sir Alexander Campbell, Baronet and others pursued David Ballingall, alleging that altered circumstances had affected his possession or right since enrollment and that his qualification was nominal or fictitious. Ballingall answered the condescendence and petition, denying any alteration of circumstances and maintaining that his qualification was genuine and valid. The dispute turned on whether Ballingall's enrollment remained effective given the alleged changes and the nature of his qualification.
Sir William Eliott v. George and Thomas Currie	1796	Lease, Tack, Rent, Trustees, Entail, Succession	Sir William Eliott of Stobs, Baronet, pursued George and Thomas Currie to determine whether an heir of entail could grant a lease at a diminished rent in consideration of a grassum. Eliott maintained that such a lease was prohibited, while George Currie argued that the entail's silence on the letting of leases permitted him to enter a lease below the former rental. After the court pronounced an interlocutor, Eliott presented a reclaiming petition asking the Court to alter that decision.
Stewart v. Hoome	1789	Succession, Debt, Tailzie, Disposition, Entail, Adjudication	Charles Stewart of Annapolis in Maryland, Esquire, and David Stewart his brother and attorney, as pursuers, argued against Hoome that the defender's father lacked power to alter the entail succession by marriage settlement. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
The Duke of Argyle v. The Earl of Dunmore	1795	Succession, Charter, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment, Adjudication	The Duke of Argyll, pursuer, argued against the Earl of Dunmore, defender, that he was entitled to reserve a year's rent from heirs of entail who were not heirs of line of the last investiture. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
The Marchioness of Titchfield and her Husband, for his interest v. Alexander Penrose Cuming	1797	Succession, Debt, Liferent, Entail, Heritor, Disposition	The Marchioness of Titchfield and her husband, for his interest, pursued Alexander Penrose Cuming, who defended on the plea of res judicata. The pursuers petitioned the Court to alter the interlocutor sustaining this defence, and Cuming answered. They then presented a second petition asking the Court to overturn the interlocutor regarding the res judicata plea, to which Cuming also answered.
Thomson &c v. St. Clair Erskine	1794	Debt, Succession, Entail, Disposition, Aliment, Heritor	Thomson and others, as petitioners, sought alteration of an interlocutor that had ordered them to pay Lady Erskine's annuity from Whitsunday 1791. Sir James St Clair Erskine, as defender, argued that the bond of annuity granted by General St Clair constituted his personal debt rather than that of Mr Thomson, general disponee of the late Colonel St Clair. The question was whether liability for the annuity fell upon Colonel St Clair's estate or upon Sir James as successor to the grantor's obligation.