Tailzie, or Entail; in its largest signification, signifies any deed whereby the course of succession is cut off, and any one substituted. But the term is usually applied to a deed framed in terms of the statute 1685, c. 22, and intended for the purpose

Definition source

Bell, William, A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, 7th ed. rev. George Ross (Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute, 1861), s.v. “Tailzie.” Public domain.

Legal Subject: Tailzie

Case	Date	Legal Subject	Abstract
Alexander-Charles Maitland, & Others v. Dame Helen Maitland Gibson, & Spouse	1830	Compensation, Security, Succession, Debt, Tailzie, Entail	Alexander-Charles Maitland and other heirs of entail pursued Dame Helen Maitland Gibson and her spouse regarding £7000 paid by a canal company for consent to route a canal through the entailed estate. The pursuers sought to have the sum paid into a bank for lawful investment under the 1827 Act, asserting it was compensation for permanent damage belonging to the entail, while the defenders answered that it represented merely the value of the land and payment for temporary inconvenience. The court found that the defenders must compensate the heirs for the permanent damage sustained by the estate from the canal deviation, with the compensation to be paid from the £7000 received for the consent.
Bromfield v. Paterson et al	1786	Succession, Debt, Liferent, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment	Stephen Bromfield pursued Mary Paterson, Alexander Campbell, and Henry Campbell regarding the estate of Eccles, contending that the defenders were bound by an entail and could not claim the lands without limitations. The defenders argued that the entail of 1743 and its 1755 amendment bound the succession to the barony of Eccles and lands of Stow, and further maintained that a deed of 1758 continued the prior entail, citing the precedent in Lowrie v. Spalding.
Dumfries v. Campbell	1795	Heritor, Tailzie, Adjudication, Interlocutor, Non-Entry, Rent	Dumfries, as heir to his mother and petitioner, sought to alter an interlocutor of December 1792 that had permitted the transference of an action of non-entry against him. Campbell responded that a declarator of nonentry commenced against the mother could be transferred in statu quo against her son and heir without requiring that he first take a passive title.
Dunbar v. Dunbars, et al	1798	Succession, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment, Debt, Teinds	Sir Benjamin Dunbar, pursuer, presented a reclaiming petition asking the Court to alter its interlocutor of 2 February 1799, which had assoilzied him from the conclusions of his action against the defenders, the Dunbars, et al. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Gibson v. Reid	1795	Debt, Succession, Aliment, Entail, Terce, Tailzie	The respondent Gibson answered the petition of Christian Kerr Reid, contending that the petitioner’s condescendence underestimated the free rents of Hofelaw and failed to account for equitable relief for the widow. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Henderson v. Wilson and Melvilles	1795	Succession, Deed, Will, Entail, Aliment, Tailzie	Robert Henderson pursued a claim against George Wilson regarding the succession to Walter Bowman’s estate, while Catharine and Christian Melvilles argued that a 1763 entail was ineffectual and had revoked an earlier 1757 deed, thereby opening the succession to heirs ab intestato. Henderson petitioned the Court to alter a recent interlocutor, and Wilson answered both Henderson’s petition and the Melvilles’ memorial, contesting their respective positions on the disputed entailments.
Henry v. Russell	1794	Succession, Entail, Disposition, Sasine, Tailzie, Teinds
J. J. Hope Vere v. Right Hon. Charles Hope and Others	1822	Succession, Entail, Tailzie, Prescription, Disposition, Sasine	James Joseph Hope Vere pursued an action of declarator against the Right Honourable Charles Hope and the other Heirs of Entail of Craigiehall regarding the succession to the estate and the effect of the tailzie of 1708. The pursuer contended that the lands were held free of entail fetters, while the defenders maintained that the 1733 marriage contract had not altered the destination of the original entail and asserted that Hope Vere was barred from reduction by contravention, forfeiture, prescription, and the tailzie's resolutive clause. Between 1823 and 1830 the parties exchanged successive defences, informations, and revised cases disputing the construction of the entail and the validity of the subsequent titles.
John Earl of Rothes v. John Philp	1758	Debt, Succession, Entail, Infeftment, Tailzie, Creditor	John Philp pursued John Earl of Rothes for 5000 merks and interest due under a bond dated 1716. The Earl defended on the ground that the estate was entailed by a 1684 deed and 1687 charter, rendering it immune from ancestral debts. The litigation turned on whether the 1685 Tailzie Act required judicial registration of pre-1685 entails to render them valid against creditors, with the Earl asserting that the entail was binding under common law and a 1662 Court of Session decision and that the Act did not apply retroactively.
Menzies v. Beresford	1801	Tailzie	(From Morison) The estate of Culdares was limited by a deed of entail executed in the year 1697, which contained the usual prohibitory, irritant, and resolutive clauses. The devise was, to James Menzies and his heirs-male; whom failing, to John Stewart of Cardneys and his heirs-male; whom failing, to George Stewart, the brother of the former, and his heirs-male; and these all failing, to the entailer's heirs-male. After this followed a destination in favour of the entailer’s heirs whatsoever, and their assignees. James Menzies, and the late Commissioner Menzies, his only son, who had no male-issue, agreed to execute a supplementary entail; whereby, in addition to the substitutes speciﬁed in the former deed, their own heirs, including, in the ﬁrstplace, the Commissioner’s daughter, were called to the succession, before the heirs whatsoever of the original entailer. After the death of Commissioner Menzies, who survived his father, John Stewart of Cardneys, now Menzies of Culdares, made up his titles by a service, under the original entail. He afterwards (in 1777) brought an action against Elizabeth Mackenzie Menzies (later Elizabeth Mackenzie Beresford), the daughter of Commissioner Menzies, for setting aside the additional settlement, which had been completed by charter and investment. In this manner the general question occurred, How far a person possessing an estate under a strict entail, himself not being the last substitute, could make a suppletory entail, to take effect when the subsisting one should come to an end. The case proceeded to the House of Lords, who remitted the case back to the Court of Sessions in 1801.
Mrs A. V. S. T. Anderson v. John Anderson	1827	Reduction, Tailzie, Entail, Succession, Aliment, Expenses	Mrs A. V. S. T. Anderson, pursuer, lodged a reclaiming note against an interlocutor pronounced by Lord Moncreiff in her action against John Anderson, defender. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Murray v. Earl of Breadalbane	1766	Exhibition Ad Deliberandum, Heir-apparent, Tailzie, Succession	Pursuers Mary and Margaret Murray, who claimed to be heirs apparent to the estate of Shian, brought an action of exhibition ad deliberandum; that is, they sought the production of documents to help them decide whether to take up the succession. The Earl of Breadalbane claimed that he had obtained good title to Shian, blocking the Murrays’ succession. Therefore, he sought to avoid producing additional documents.
Ogilvie v. Mercer	1793	Succession, Deed, Reduction, Disposition, Entail, Tailzie	Sir John Ogilvy of Invercarity, Hope Stewart of Ballechin, and Miss Margaret Mercer Elphinstone challenged the validity of a deed of entail executed by Robert Mercer on 22 February 1791, arguing that it was void as a death‑bed settlement. Katharine Mercer subsequently petitioned the Court to alter the interlocutor pronounced in the case.
Robert Wellwood v. Robert Wellwood and Others	1791	Liferent, Tailzie, Entail, Infeftment, Succession, Tack	Robert Wellwood of Garvock pursued Robert Wellwood and others, contending that he was not an heir of tailzie and therefore not bound by the entail’s fetters. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Stewart v. Hoome	1789	Succession, Debt, Tailzie, Disposition, Entail, Adjudication	Charles Stewart of Annapolis in Maryland, Esquire, and David Stewart his brother and attorney, as pursuers, argued against Hoome that the defender's father lacked power to alter the entail succession by marriage settlement. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
The Duke of Argyle v. The Earl of Dunmore	1795	Succession, Charter, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment, Adjudication	The Duke of Argyll, pursuer, argued against the Earl of Dunmore, defender, that he was entitled to reserve a year's rent from heirs of entail who were not heirs of line of the last investiture. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.