AI-transcribed

Tailzie, or Entail; in its largest signification, signifies any deed whereby the course of succession is cut off, and any one substituted. But the term is usually applied to a deed framed in terms of the statute 1685, c. 22, and intended for the purpose

Definition source
AI-transcribed
Bell, William, A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, 7th ed. rev. George Ross (Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute, 1861), s.v. “Tailzie.” Public domain.

Legal Subject: Tailzie

Case Date Legal Subject Abstract
Alexander Gordon of Culvenan, and Jean Macculloch, Elder Daughter of John Macculloch, Elder of Barholm v. James Dewar of Vogrie, John Macculloch Elder, and John Macculloch Younger, of Barholm 1771 Debt, Adjudication, Tailzie, Entail, Succession, Liferent John Macculloch's estate, which encompassed a considerable land-estate in the stewarty of Kirkcudbright and shire of Wigtown, was subject to a settlement containing strict prohibitive, irritant, and resolutive clauses. This case is a dispute over inheritance claims following Macculloch's death.
Alexander Irvine of Drum v. The Earl of Aberdeen, &c 1772 Debt, Estate, Adjudication, Tailzie, Entail, Aliment The estate of Alexander Irvine of Drum was heavily burdened with debts at the time of his death. The estate went through a series of family members. Through this process, some debts were relieved but others were added. The estate was sold in 1736 to cover the debts. A small part of the estate was set aside for the Irvine family, but most of the estate went to the Earl of Aberdeen or Patrick Duff of Premnay. After John Irvine of Drum's death in 1737, the successor to the estate, Alexander Irvine of Crimond, mounted a legal challenge to the settlement of the estate. The pursuer in the present case was Alexander Irvine of Drum, grandson of Alexander Irvine of Drum. The 3rd Earl of Aberdeen, taking up a cause inherited from his father, and Patrick Duff argued that the Irvine family has no valid claims against them.
Alexander-Charles Maitland, & Others v. Dame Helen Maitland Gibson, & Spouse 1830 Compensation, Security, Succession, Debt, Tailzie, Entail Alexander-Charles Maitland and other heirs of entail pursued Dame Helen Maitland Gibson and her spouse regarding £7000 paid by a canal company for consent to route a canal through the entailed estate. The pursuers sought to have the sum paid into a bank for lawful investment under the 1827 Act, asserting it was compensation for permanent damage belonging to the entail, while the defenders answered that it represented merely the value of the land and payment for temporary inconvenience. The court found that the defenders must compensate the heirs for the permanent damage sustained by the estate from the canal deviation, with the compensation to be paid from the £7000 received for the consent.
Andrew Heron v. John Vining Heron 1766 Succession, Debt, Deed, Disposition, Tailzie, Aliment Doctor Andrew Heron pursued John Vining Heron in a dispute concerning the validity of deeds executed in 1715, 1726, and 1728, arguing that the 1715 deed was never delivered or completed while upholding the later deeds as valid settlements. After petitioning twice in July 1766 to alter a recent interlocutor, Heron replied in February 1767 regarding the deeds' validity, and John Vining Heron subsequently submitted duplies in April 1767 in obedience to the Court's interlocutor of March 4, 1767.
Boyd Porterfield of Porterfield v. Joanna, Margaret, and Lilias Porterfields 1771 Land, Title Dispute, Debt, Tailzie, Succession, Prescription Boyd Porterfield, the pursuer, claimed that he was entitled to the lands of the Porterfield family in Hapland following the death of his cousin, Gabriel. Boyd was the grandson and heir of Alexander Porterfield, who, in turn, was a cousin of Gabriel Porterfield. In 1716, Gabriel granted a bond of tailzie to Alexander. Boyd claimed that he was entitled to the lands based on the tailzie. Gabriel's three daughters, Joanna, Margaret, and Lilias, along with their husbands, challenged Boyd's claim to the lands and sought to control their father's estate.
Bromfield v. Paterson et al 1786 Succession, Debt, Liferent, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment Stephen Bromfield pursued Mary Paterson, Alexander Campbell, and Henry Campbell regarding the estate of Eccles, contending that the defenders were bound by an entail and could not claim the lands without limitations. The defenders argued that the entail of 1743 and its 1755 amendment bound the succession to the barony of Eccles and lands of Stow, and further maintained that a deed of 1758 continued the prior entail, citing the precedent in Lowrie v. Spalding.
Countess Dowager of Glencairn v. William Cunningham Cunningham Graham 1800 Debt, Tailzie, Liferent, Aliment, Succession, Deed This case determined whether an heir of entail was statutorily bound to honor a liferent provision granted by an earlier heir, John Cunningham, Earl of Glencairn, to his wife, Isabella Erskine, Countess of Glencairn. The provision was not directly effectual against the estate because Earl John died without making up a feudal title (i.e., as heir apparent). After Earl John’s death, the estate passed to Robert Graham and then to his son William Cunningham Cunningham Graham. The Countess of Glencairn brought an action against William seeking to effectuate the liferent provision pursuant to the act 1695, c. 24.
Dick v. Drysdale 1800 Tailzie, Liferent, Lease, Sasine, Tack, Interlocutor Sir Alexander held Prestonfield and Corstorphine under several strict entails dating to 1720, one of which prevented any heir from setting tacks for more than one lifetime. Sir Alexander's father, Sir William, set a tack in Drysdale that John Dick, as tutor to his nephew, sought to have voided. An Act of Parliament allowed certain types of tacks in contravention of entail clauses, but Dick maintained that the statute did not apply in this case.
Dumfries v. Campbell 1795 Heritor, Tailzie, Adjudication, Interlocutor, Non-Entry, Rent Dumfries, as heir to his mother and petitioner, sought to alter an interlocutor of December 1792 that had permitted the transference of an action of non-entry against him. Campbell responded that a declarator of nonentry commenced against the mother could be transferred in statu quo against her son and heir without requiring that he first take a passive title.
Dunbar v. Dunbars, et al 1798 Succession, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment, Debt, Teinds Sir Benjamin Dunbar, pursuer, presented a reclaiming petition asking the Court to alter its interlocutor of 2 February 1799, which had assoilzied him from the conclusions of his action against the defenders, the Dunbars, et al. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
George-Alexander Gordon v. Janet Gordon 1784 Tailzie, Succession, Disposition, Prescription, Infeftment, Reduction This case involved a dispute between women who sought to inherit property as heirs of line and another relative who sought to inherit under an entail. Near the end of his life, Bailie Charles Gordon executed an entail granting the lands of Pitlurg and Achorties to his son Alexander or, in the alternative, to a series of substitutes. Alexander inherited the property, but rather than claiming it as heir of entail, he took the lands under a precept of clare constat (a type of deed). Alexander also obtained a decree voiding the entail on the ground that it was completed on deathbed. Alexander held the property for more than 40 years, the length of the statutory prescription (limitations) period. When Alexander died in 1783, his sister Janet Gordon and niece Magdalene Grant claimed the property as heirs of line. Another relative, George-Alexander Gordon, claimed under the entail. Janet and Magdalene defended their claim with two arguments: (1) the entail was void; and (2) Alexander had defeated the entail by possessing the property for more than 40 years under an unlimited title. George-Alexander argued that the prescription period had been interrupted because he was a minor when he became the immediate substitute. He also challenged the decree voiding the entail.
Gibson v. Reid 1795 Debt, Succession, Aliment, Entail, Terce, Tailzie The respondent Gibson answered the petition of Christian Kerr Reid, contending that the petitioner’s condescendence underestimated the free rents of Hofelaw and failed to account for equitable relief for the widow. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Henderson v. Wilson and Melvilles 1795 Succession, Deed, Will, Entail, Aliment, Tailzie Robert Henderson pursued a claim against George Wilson regarding the succession to Walter Bowman’s estate, while Catharine and Christian Melvilles argued that a 1763 entail was ineffectual and had revoked an earlier 1757 deed, thereby opening the succession to heirs ab intestato. Henderson petitioned the Court to alter a recent interlocutor, and Wilson answered both Henderson’s petition and the Melvilles’ memorial, contesting their respective positions on the disputed entailments.
Henry v. Russell 1794 Succession, Entail, Disposition, Sasine, Tailzie, Teinds
J. J. Hope Vere v. Right Hon. Charles Hope and Others 1822 Succession, Entail, Tailzie, Prescription, Disposition, Sasine James Joseph Hope Vere pursued an action of declarator against the Right Honourable Charles Hope and the other Heirs of Entail of Craigiehall regarding the succession to the estate and the effect of the tailzie of 1708. The pursuer contended that the lands were held free of entail fetters, while the defenders maintained that the 1733 marriage contract had not altered the destination of the original entail and asserted that Hope Vere was barred from reduction by contravention, forfeiture, prescription, and the tailzie's resolutive clause. Between 1823 and 1830 the parties exchanged successive defences, informations, and revised cases disputing the construction of the entail and the validity of the subsequent titles.
John Earl of Rothes v. John Philp 1758 Debt, Succession, Entail, Infeftment, Tailzie, Creditor John Philp pursued John Earl of Rothes for 5000 merks and interest due under a bond dated 1716. The Earl defended on the ground that the estate was entailed by a 1684 deed and 1687 charter, rendering it immune from ancestral debts. The litigation turned on whether the 1685 Tailzie Act required judicial registration of pre-1685 entails to render them valid against creditors, with the Earl asserting that the entail was binding under common law and a 1662 Court of Session decision and that the Act did not apply retroactively.
John Johnston v. William Morehead 1790 Liferent, Disposition, Tailzie, Charter, Entail, Succession John Johnston sought to overturn the enrollment of William Morehead junior as a freeholder in Stirling county, alleging that Morehead’s liferent qualification was nominal and fictitious. Morehead defended his title as valid and absolute, maintaining that the conveyance was not revocable and that the entail did not entitle Johnston to recall the liferent right. The parties exchanged replies and duplies, followed by a condescendence and answers debating whether the liferent was absolute, and Johnston subsequently noted a reclaiming petition regarding the non-existence of a deed of entail dated November 28, 1786.
Lady Clementina Fleming v. The Hon. Charles Elphinstone et al 1797 Succession, Debt, Tailzie, Entail, Liferent, Aliment Lady Clementina Fleming pursued the Honourable Charles Elphinstone and the other Heirs of Entail concerning the 1741 entail of the earldom of Wigton. The defenders contended that Lady Clementina was barred from challenging the entail's validity, while she argued that the entail could not oblige her to assume the surname of Fleming or bear the arms of Wigton, as the marriage contract had waived those requirements.
Menzies v. Beresford 1801 Tailzie (From Morison) The estate of Culdares was limited by a deed of entail executed in the year 1697, which contained the usual prohibitory, irritant, and resolutive clauses. The devise was, to James Menzies and his heirs-male; whom failing, to John Stewart of Cardneys and his heirs-male; whom failing, to George Stewart, the brother of the former, and his heirs-male; and these all failing, to the entailer's heirs-male. After this followed a destination in favour of the entailer’s heirs whatsoever, and their assignees. James Menzies, and the late Commissioner Menzies, his only son, who had no male-issue, agreed to execute a supplementary entail; whereby, in addition to the substitutes specified in the former deed, their own heirs, including, in the firstplace, the Commissioner’s daughter, were called to the succession, before the heirs whatsoever of the original entailer. After the death of Commissioner Menzies, who survived his father, John Stewart of Cardneys, now Menzies of Culdares, made up his titles by a service, under the original entail. He afterwards (in 1777) brought an action against Elizabeth Mackenzie Menzies (later Elizabeth Mackenzie Beresford), the daughter of Commissioner Menzies, for setting aside the additional settlement, which had been completed by charter and investment. In this manner the general question occurred, How far a person possessing an estate under a strict entail, himself not being the last substitute, could make a suppletory entail, to take effect when the subsisting one should come to an end. The case proceeded to the House of Lords, who remitted the case back to the Court of Sessions in 1801.
Mrs A. V. S. T. Anderson v. John Anderson 1827 Reduction, Tailzie, Entail, Succession, Aliment, Expenses Mrs A. V. S. T. Anderson, pursuer, lodged a reclaiming note against an interlocutor pronounced by Lord Moncreiff in her action against John Anderson, defender. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Murray v. Earl of Breadalbane 1766 Exhibition Ad Deliberandum, Heir-apparent, Tailzie, Succession, Adjudication, Disposition Pursuers Mary and Margaret Murray, who claimed to be heirs apparent to the estate of Shian, brought an action of exhibition ad deliberandum; that is, they sought the production of documents to help them decide whether to take up the succession. The Earl of Breadalbane claimed that he had obtained good title to Shian, blocking the Murrays’ succession. Therefore, he sought to avoid producing additional documents.
Ogilvie v. Mercer 1793 Succession, Deed, Reduction, Disposition, Entail, Tailzie Sir John Ogilvy of Invercarity, Hope Stewart of Ballechin, and Miss Margaret Mercer Elphinstone challenged the validity of a deed of entail executed by Robert Mercer on 22 February 1791, arguing that it was void as a death‑bed settlement. Katharine Mercer subsequently petitioned the Court to alter the interlocutor pronounced in the case.
Petition of the Countess of Sutherland 1792 Debt, Tailzie, Entail, Arrestment, Succession, Election contest Elizabeth Countess of Sutherland and George Granville Leveson Gower, now Sutherland, petitioned the Court to permit them to sist themselves as parties to a question concerning the recording of the entail of the Sutherland estate. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Robert Wellwood v. Robert Wellwood and Others 1791 Liferent, Tailzie, Entail, Infeftment, Succession, Tack Robert Wellwood of Garvock pursued Robert Wellwood and others, contending that he was not an heir of tailzie and therefore not bound by the entail’s fetters. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Sommervell, Porterfield, and Paterson v. Lord Justice-Clerk's Interlocutor 1798 Tailzie, Entail, Aliment, Succession, Marriage, Next of Kin William Sommervell of Kennox, Mrs Lilias Porterfield, and Peter Paterson, Writer in Glasgow, petitioned the Court to alter a recent interlocutor pronounced by the Lord Justice-Clerk. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Stewart v. Hoome 1789 Succession, Debt, Tailzie, Disposition, Entail, Adjudication Charles Stewart of Annapolis in Maryland, Esquire, and David Stewart his brother and attorney, as pursuers, argued against Hoome that the defender's father lacked power to alter the entail succession by marriage settlement. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
Stirlings v. Sir John Stirling of Glorat, Baronet 1800 Debt, Succession, Teinds, Entail, Aliment, Tailzie This case addressed the scope and efficacy of an entail executed by Sir Alexander Stirling (father of defender Sir John Stirling) in relation to property he inherited from Sir John Home of Renton. The inheritance included the lands and barony of Renton, which were held of the Crown, and certain lands held of subject-superiors: Swansfield, Warlawbank, and husband-lands in Renton, all held of Mr. Home of Wedderburn; and Fleshywells, held of the Home family of Coldingham. (More detailed place names are listed in the Appendix to the Petition of Sir John Stirling of Glorat, Baronet, dated January 13, 1801.) Sir Alexander made up feudal titles to the barony of Renton, but not to the lands held of subject-superiors. He also executed a deed of entail, the scope of which was disputed, along with a companion trust-deed. Sir John Stirling subsequently succeeded his father and made up titles to the lands held by subject-superiors, claiming as “nearest and lawful heir to Sir John Home.” After questions were raised about Sir Alexander’s entail, the heirs brought this action to resolve the legal status of the lands in question.
The Duke of Argyle v. The Earl of Dunmore 1795 Succession, Charter, Entail, Tailzie, Infeftment, Adjudication The Duke of Argyll, pursuer, argued against the Earl of Dunmore, defender, that he was entitled to reserve a year's rent from heirs of entail who were not heirs of line of the last investiture. Based on the single document cataloged for this case.
The Right Honourable Lord Elibank and Others v. Patrick Murray 1832 Land, Clause, Statute, Debt, Adjudication, Tailzie Lord Elibank and the Commissioners pursued Patrick Murray of Simprim to determine whether a 1776 entail deed prohibited Murray from selling the entailed lands. Murray answered, responding to the argument that the deed restricted his right to alienate the property. The Complainers subsequently submitted their case asserting that Murray was barred from alienating the lands under the terms of the settlement.
William Hamilton v. Mary Burton-Hamilton 1765 Aliment, Reduction, Debt, Tailzie, Succession, Infeftment Sir William Hamilton of West-Port pursued Mary Burton-Hamilton and Mary De Gares, alias Bonamy, seeking reduction of two heritable bonds and petitioning the Court to alter a recent interlocutor. The defenders answered, resisting the reduction, and Burton-Hamilton subsequently replied, defending her claim by asserting that she was entitled to indemnification for expenses and that her guardian had acted in fulfillment of his duty, notwithstanding any objection on grounds of ob turpem causam.

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