Removing

Ejectment by a landlord.

Definition source

Kinnear, J. B., Digest of House of Lords Cases Decided on Appeal from Scotland, 1709-1864 — Glossary of Scottish Law Terms (Edinburgh, 1865). Public domain.

Legal Subject: Removing

Case	Date	Legal Subject	Abstract
Inglis v. Gray	1785	Tack, Lease, Sequestration, Title, Infeftment, Removing	This case was about defender Walter Gray’s tack on the estate of Langwell. Shortly after Walter agreed to the tack, his brother William purchased Langwell. William granted bonds over the estate to Hugh Inglis and John Cartier as security for certain debts. Later, Inglis and Carter initiated court proceedings involving the property, which was sequestered under the supervision of a factor. Inglis also sought to void Walter’s tack or have Walter removed from the estate. Inglis alleged that Walter’s rent was far below the value of the property as stated on a rent roll that Walter had endorsed. Inglis also claimed that the tack would expire soon and that Walter was in arrears on his rent. Walter objected that Inglis’s security right, unlike a full property right, did not entitle him to challenge the tack or remove a tenant; when Inglis attempted to add the factor as a pursuer, Walter argued that this was a procedural irregularity. Walter also argued that William had granted him a new lease and that he was not in arrears on rent.
Irving v. Lowther	1765	Rent, Sequestration, Possession, Tack, Removing, Bankruptcy	John Irving, feuar in Dornock and brother-german and heir to William Irving, petitioned the Court to alter its recent interlocutor against George Lowther, portioner of Dornock. Lowther answered, claiming active title to remove sub-tenants who held only from him and contending that their lease from a factor was invalid.
Lord Halkerton v. Scott	1769	Interlocutor, Aliment, Presumption, Thirlage, Removing, Innovation	Lord Halkerton pursued James Scott of Brothertown regarding a causeway and cruive-dyke alleged to obstruct salmon passage. Scott condescended upon a proposal to sink part of his causeway to confine water within keying-stones, intending to remove objections to the construction. The superior heritors answered, arguing that the proposed alteration would not remedy the obstruction to salmon passage.
Marjoribanks and Ramsay v. Spottiswoods	1795	Tack, Adjudication, Heritor, Lease, Possession, Removing	Marjoribanks and Ramsay raised an action to remove Spottiswoods from Hallyards farm after the lease expired, alleging that the defenders refused to vacate despite implied notice and prior conduct indicating an intent to leave. The defenders maintained that no lawful intimation had been given forty days prior to Whitsunday as required by the tack. The litigation turned on whether the statutory or conventional notice period for removal had been satisfied.
Robertson v. McClure	1779	Roup, Penalty, Removing, Sist, Debt, Adjudication	In 1758, John McClure commissioned William Robertson to offer £112 for a house and yard at a public roup (auction). According to McClure, Robertson purchased the property at a higher rate than authorized. McClure refused to pay the price. Robertson then became subject to penalties and other expenses, which compelled him to bring a process against McClure before the Magistrates of Ayr. The Magistrates granted a decree in absence, against which McClure then obtained a (sist) judicial stay. Despite this stay, Robertson then made the debt over to James Fergusson. In August 1775, Fergusson obtained a decree of adjudication against McClure on account of the above-mentioned decree and some debts that had been owed by McClure's father. Fergusson then assigned this adjudication to Robert Robertson, the son of William Robertson. Robert Robertson took possession of some property owned by McClure after which he successfully brought a process of removing against him. McClure applied by bill of suspension to the Court of Session, which was refused by Lord Gardenstone. McClure then petitioned the Court for review, arguing that both debts were invalid: one, because there was a sist on it, and the other, because it had been extinguished by a decree of mails and duties obtained by Robertson. Furthermore, he argued that because his property were jointly owned by him and his four siblings, the charger's decree of moving was erroneous in regard to four-fifths of the property.

Documents discussing this subject (56)